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On October 13, the U.S. House Select Committee on China released a new report, How to Stop China’s Theft of America's Taxpayer-Funded Research: The Reforms We Need and Rebuttals to Those Who Oppose Them. The 39-page report provides a rebuttal to arguments the Select Committee has encountered related to research security and makes recommendations to strengthen research security. The report suggests that “the purpose of research security safeguards is not to eliminate international collaboration or undermine scientific progress. Rather, the purpose is to ensure that taxpayer-funded research does not directly or indirectly support foreign military advancement, human rights abuses, strategic competitors, or entities acting contrary to U.S. national security interests.” The report goes into particular detail on how co-authorship is indicative of collaboration, the unequal benefits of collaboration with China, prohibition of collaboration with high-risk entities, the inability of academia to self-police research security risks, and the need to protect federal research funding. The Committee makes the case, with examples, that there is a repeated pattern of intentional compliance failures and not simple clerical errors with reporting. The report acknowledges the continued benefit from contributions of Chinese American researchers, while pointing out the Chinese government’s policy of technology and scientific talent acquisition. The four recommendations are: 1) Pass the Securing Innovation and Research from Adversaries (SIRA) Act: This act (H.R. 8901) would prohibit any federally funded research award or any other form of federal financial assistance for use by an individual or entity listed on a U.S. government restricted entity list or an individual associated with such an entity. The restricted entity list in the act closely follows the current DoW prohibited entity lists. Research collaboration is broadly defined to include co-authorship (as noted in the report), data sharing or processing, material transfer, personnel exchanges, visiting scholar appointments, or joint supervision of students or researchers. The report encourages institutions to proactively implement policies “prohibiting federally funded research collaborations with entities that pose identified national security risks.” 2) Standardized Author Contribution Disclosure Requirements for (at a minimum) Federally Funded Research: Require standardized author contribution statements on publications or other outputs resulting from federally funded research with agencies evaluating enforcement. 3) Create Incentives for Universities That Adopt Strong Research Security Practices: Institutions that exceed minimum research security requirements and “demonstrate a sustained commitment to federal funded research” could be designated as “trusted universities,” which could include incentives such as priority for certain funding opportunities. 4) Government-Wide Adoption of Fact-Based Suspension and Debarment Authorities Beyond Conviction-Based Suspension and Debarments: Agencies should standardize suspension and debarment authorities for research security violations, more aggressively use available administrative false claims authorities, and not treat criminal convictions, civil judgements, or prosecution as prerequisites for administrative accountability. To support the report, the Select Committee released over 700 pages of records (one case was over 200 pages) covering 20 research security cases at U.S. institutions investigated by the National Science Foundation (NSF) Office of Inspector General (OIG), including OIG reports from 2018-2025. The records identify efforts by China to recruit researchers at U.S. institutions in key technology areas. The cases involved undisclosed foreign appointments, participation in talent programs, conflicts of commitment, failure to disclose foreign funding and compensation, and research misconduct. Cases resulted in suspension or termination of awards, debarment of researchers from receiving federal funding or serving as NSF reviewers, and criminal indictments (e.g., wire fraud). Several of the researchers resigned from their positions and left the U.S. for China. The Committee’s reported aim with the release of previously non-public records is to provide greater transparency on the evidence underlying research security investigations and the findings informing the Committee’s recommendations.

On July 8, 2026, the National Science Foundation (NSF) issued a Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) announcing a forthcoming policy that will bar NSF funds from supporting collaborations with entities on U.S. restricted parties lists. Senior/key personnel will be prohibited from collaborating with restricted entities on NSF-funded projects and will also be prohibited from holding an appointment or position with, or receiving research support from, listed entities for the duration of the NSF award. Per the DCL: "NSF appropriated funds shall not be used for grants, contracts, other transactions or other assistance to an organization if the purpose is to conduct research in collaboration with restricted entities. This funding prohibition also extends to the employees of such restricted entities." In Appendix A, NSF lists 12 restricted party lists, an increase from the current four lists and in near alignment with the Department of War (DoW). To comply, Authorized Organizational Representatives and senior/key personnel will need to certify to this effect at proposal submission, and organizations will be responsible for ensuring awareness of and compliance with the prohibition. NSF notes that this change aligns with the DoW's approach to restricted-party collaborations, with the aim of safeguarding NSF-funded research while promoting consistency and reducing administrative burden. NSF intends to implement the prohibition in Fiscal Year 2027. Per the DCL, questions can be directed to researchsecurity@nsf.gov.

On December 5, 2025, NSF notified the research community that it is offering a grace period for enforcement of Important Notice No. 149 for proposals submitted between December 2 and December 31, 2025, to accommodate programs with deadlines near the December 2, 2025 effective date. NSF will continue to accept proposals using the previous Biographical Sketch and Current and Pending (Other) Support forms until December 31, 2025; after that date, all proposals must incorporate the new senior/key personnel certifications (research security training within the past 12 months and not being a party to a malign foreign talent recruitment program) required under Important Notice No. 149.

On November 25, 2025, the National Science Foundation (NSF) released an update to the agency's Important Notice No. 149. The update states that the requirements originally slated to take effect in October 2025 instead take effect on December 2, 2025 as a result of the recent government shutdown. The impacted requirements include: certifications of research security training for senior/key personnel; institutional certifications regarding contracts or agreements with Confucius Institutes; and recipient institutions providing supporting documentation for senior/key personnel activities reported as current and pending (other) support (e.g., contracts, grants, appointment letters) to NSF, upon request.

Published July 10, 2025. Includes NSF implementation of three new requirements (and three existing ones) in alignment with the CHIPS and Science Act and NSPM-33. The requirements, effective October 10, 2025, include: a. Recipient institutions must maintain supporting documentation for foreign activities reported as current and pending (other) support, b. Senior/key personnel must certify they have completed research security training (RST) within 12 months prior to proposal submission; Recipient institutions' Authorized Organizational Representative (AOR) must certify that all senior/key personnel have completed required RST and that the institution has a plan to provide appropriate training, c. AORs at institutions of higher education (IHEs) must certify that, absent a waiver granted by the NSF Director, the IHE does not maintain a contract or agreement between the institution and a Confucius Institute.

The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 directs federal research funding agencies to establish a policy that requires each covered individual (CI) listed in an R&D proposal to certify that they are not a party to a MFTRP in the proposal submission and annually thereafter for the duration of the award. NSF was the first federal agency to implement this certification via the common federal biosketch and current and pending support forms in May 2024. NSF began rolling out the annual certification on June 7, 2025, for all PIs and co-PIs named on an NSF award made on or after May 20, 2024. NSF is making sample contracts available that meet the parameters of a MFTRP. Contract examples and frequently asked questions can be found on the NSF website under MFTRPs.

June 2024. NSF initiated a proposal risk review process similar to that of DoD but with some notable differences. NSF's process will focus on critical technologies, beginning with a pilot of quantum technologies proposals in FY25, expanding to other key technologies in phase 2, and scaling up for all key technologies identified in the CHIPS and Science Act in phase 3. NSF will evaluate Three Criteria: 1. Appointments and positions with U.S. proscribed parties (e.g., U.S. BIS Entity List) and currently party to a MFTRP; 2. Non-disclosures of appointments, activities, and financial support; and 3. Potential foreseeable national security applications of the research. NSF will consider only current foreign appointments and affiliations and is not considering co-authorship in risk assessment.

Additional information on NSF's Trusted Research Using Safeguards and Transparency (TRUST) proposal risk review process, presented at the Federal Demonstration Partnership (FDP) meeting in May 2024. The document walks through how NSF's TRUST review operates, including its phased rollout beginning with a pilot of quantum proposals and the three criteria NSF evaluates when assessing proposals for research security risk.

A summary of the NSF-funded workshop 'Responsible Collaboration Through Appropriate Research Security' held at Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy in May 2024. Discusses challenges and opportunities in the emerging field of RoRS and provides recommendations to guide NSF's new RoRS program.

A March 2024 report commissioned by NSF and issued by the JASON group. Recommends NSF adopt a dynamic approach for identifying potentially sensitive research topics as they arise and weigh the balance between the protective benefits and the unintended negative consequences of controls on sensitive research. It is suggested that the identification of sensitive projects proposed to NSF occurs most naturally before peer or panel review. Specific mitigation strategies for sensitive research projects should be negotiated and agreed upon by the principal investigator (PI), NSF, and the institution and be proportionate to the assessed risk, relative to the associated costs.

A Dear Colleague Letter issued by NSF in May 2023 regarding the NSPM-33 Research Security Programs Standard Requirement.

A March 2023 report issued by JASON and commissioned by NSF. Provides definitions of Research Integrity as adherence to accepted values and principles -- objectivity, honesty, openness, accountability, fairness, and stewardship -- that guide the conduct of research. Research Security is protecting the means, know-how, and products of research until they are ready to be shared. JASON suggests research security does not vary across disciplines, but the consequences of breaches in research security and the measures taken to prevent breaches will differ. Key points include an emphasis on training researchers on risks in international collaborations, the need to encourage collaboration with international organizations that are also concerned with research security, and avoiding creating a reputation of racial profiling or using the research security programs to disadvantage anyone based on ethnicity or nationality.

February 2023. Outlines advanced monitoring and verification activities of NSF proposals and awards. The guidelines largely serve to provide transparency and identify guardrails NSF has put in place around the use of data analytics to monitor and validate information disclosed (e.g., in biosketches and current and pending support). For example, the activities are not investigative and cannot be incorporated into the merit review process. Sources of information include SCOPUS, Web of Science, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Patent Database.

The NSF Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide (NSF 23-1, January 2023). Post-award Disclosure of Current Support and In-Kind Contribution Information: PAPPG Chapter II.D.2.h(ii).

Directs [NSF] to establish a research security and integrity information sharing analysis organization to enable the research community to share information, identify research security risks, and implement risk assessment and mitigation best practices and procurement of a non-government organization to run this center. The SECURE Program, including the SECURE Center and SECURE Analytics, were implemented to answer this call.

Directs NSF to collect annual summaries of foreign financial support from universities. The provision establishes a reporting threshold of $50,000 or more in [cumulative] financial support, including gifts and contracts, received directly or indirectly from a foreign country of concern (China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran at the time the law was enacted), or any other country determined to be a concern by the Secretary of State. This is in addition to the reporting of gifts and contracts from all foreign countries with a cumulative value of $250,000 or more via the Higher Education Act and Department of Education.

Authorizes the NSF OCRSSP, in coordination with the Office of Inspector General (OIG), to conduct risk assessments, including through the use of open-source analysis and analytical tools, of R&D award applications and disclosures to NSF.

Directs [NSF] to develop an online resource to inform institutions and researchers of security risks and best practices and explain Foundation research security policies.

Establishes a Chief of Research Security position within the NSF Office of the Director to manage the Office of Research Security and Policy.

Establishes an Office of Research Security, Strategy, and Policy within NSF.

Places restrictions on eligibility for NSF R&D funding for institutions that host or support Confucius [or Confucius-like] institutes.

Expands the requirement for RCR training to include faculty and other senior personnel on [NSF] awards and expands the scope of such training to include mentoring training and training to raise awareness of research security risks as well as Federal export control, disclosure, and reporting requirements.

Signed January 3, 2020. Section 223 mandates disclosure of funding sources in applications for federal R&D awards and holds universities accountable for ensuring faculty awareness. Section 1299C is an amendment to FY 2019 NDAA Section 1286 requiring designation of an official responsible for liaising with academic institutions and briefing them on espionage risks. Section 1062 restricts DoD and NSF funds to institutions hosting a Confucius Institute. Section 9907 prohibits any funds for microelectronics initiatives to a foreign entity of concern.

NSF's formal response to the JASON Group's report on Fundamental Research Security, outlining how the Foundation plans to address the report's findings and recommendations.

A December 2019 report from the JASON Group commissioned by NSF. The report outlines that concerns of foreign influence can be addressed within the framework of research integrity and, in addition, that the benefits of openness in research and of the inclusion of foreign researchers dictate against measures that would restrict fundamental research. The report includes questions for researchers to consider when entering a collaboration [Section 7.3 Assessment Tools: pages 34-36].