On October 13, the U.S. House Select Committee on China released a new report, How to Stop China’s Theft of America's Taxpayer-Funded Research: The Reforms We Need and Rebuttals to Those Who Oppose Them. The 39-page report provides a rebuttal to arguments the Select Committee has encountered related to research security and makes recommendations to strengthen research security. The report suggests that “the purpose of research security safeguards is not to eliminate international collaboration or undermine scientific progress. Rather, the purpose is to ensure that taxpayer-funded research does not directly or indirectly support foreign military advancement, human rights abuses, strategic competitors, or entities acting contrary to U.S. national security interests.” The report goes into particular detail on how co-authorship is indicative of collaboration, the unequal benefits of collaboration with China, prohibition of collaboration with high-risk entities, the inability of academia to self-police research security risks, and the need to protect federal research funding. The Committee makes the case, with examples, that there is a repeated pattern of intentional compliance failures and not simple clerical errors with reporting. The report acknowledges the continued benefit from contributions of Chinese American researchers, while pointing out the Chinese government’s policy of technology and scientific talent acquisition. The four recommendations are: 1) Pass the Securing Innovation and Research from Adversaries (SIRA) Act: This act (H.R. 8901) would prohibit any federally funded research award or any other form of federal financial assistance for use by an individual or entity listed on a U.S. government restricted entity list or an individual associated with such an entity. The restricted entity list in the act closely follows the current DoW prohibited entity lists. Research collaboration is broadly defined to include co-authorship (as noted in the report), data sharing or processing, material transfer, personnel exchanges, visiting scholar appointments, or joint supervision of students or researchers. The report encourages institutions to proactively implement policies “prohibiting federally funded research collaborations with entities that pose identified national security risks.” 2) Standardized Author Contribution Disclosure Requirements for (at a minimum) Federally Funded Research: Require standardized author contribution statements on publications or other outputs resulting from federally funded research with agencies evaluating enforcement. 3) Create Incentives for Universities That Adopt Strong Research Security Practices: Institutions that exceed minimum research security requirements and “demonstrate a sustained commitment to federal funded research” could be designated as “trusted universities,” which could include incentives such as priority for certain funding opportunities. 4) Government-Wide Adoption of Fact-Based Suspension and Debarment Authorities Beyond Conviction-Based Suspension and Debarments: Agencies should standardize suspension and debarment authorities for research security violations, more aggressively use available administrative false claims authorities, and not treat criminal convictions, civil judgements, or prosecution as prerequisites for administrative accountability. To support the report, the Select Committee released over 700 pages of records (one case was over 200 pages) covering 20 research security cases at U.S. institutions investigated by the National Science Foundation (NSF) Office of Inspector General (OIG), including OIG reports from 2018-2025. The records identify efforts by China to recruit researchers at U.S. institutions in key technology areas. The cases involved undisclosed foreign appointments, participation in talent programs, conflicts of commitment, failure to disclose foreign funding and compensation, and research misconduct. Cases resulted in suspension or termination of awards, debarment of researchers from receiving federal funding or serving as NSF reviewers, and criminal indictments (e.g., wire fraud). Several of the researchers resigned from their positions and left the U.S. for China. The Committee’s reported aim with the release of previously non-public records is to provide greater transparency on the evidence underlying research security investigations and the findings informing the Committee’s recommendations.
Reference Library
Browse and search all federal research security policies, guidance, and compliance requirements.
On July 28, 2026, the federal government issued a new government-wide policy prohibiting federal funding for gain-of-function research deemed to be high-risk and establishing a risk-based oversight framework for other high-risk life sciences work. Issued pursuant to Executive Order 14292, the policy replaces earlier oversight frameworks dating back to 2012 and defines two top-risk categories: dangerous gain-of-function (DGOF) research and international research of concern (IROC). Beyond the funding prohibition, it introduces expanded review, certification, monitoring, reporting, and enforcement obligations for institutions and researchers receiving federal life sciences funding, and it restricts federally supported research conducted in countries deemed to lack adequate biosafety and biosecurity oversight. On the same day, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) issued NOT-OD-26-101, noting that the agency is working to implement the new policy and that research previously paused under related 2025 gain-of-function directives (NOT-OD-25-127 and NOT-OD-25-112) remains suspended pending further guidance.
On July 28, 2026, the federal government issued a new government-wide policy prohibiting federal funding for gain-of-function research deemed to be high-risk and establishing a risk-based oversight framework for other high-risk life sciences work. Issued pursuant to Executive Order 14292, the policy replaces earlier oversight frameworks dating back to 2012 and defines two top-risk categories: dangerous gain-of-function (DGOF) research and international research of concern (IROC). Beyond the funding prohibition, it introduces expanded review, certification, monitoring, reporting, and enforcement obligations for institutions and researchers receiving federal life sciences funding, and it restricts federally supported research conducted in countries deemed to lack adequate biosafety and biosecurity oversight. On the same day, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) issued NOT-OD-26-101, noting that the agency is working to implement the new policy and that research previously paused under related 2025 gain-of-function directives (NOT-OD-25-127 and NOT-OD-25-112) remains suspended pending further guidance.
On December 18, 2025, the U.S. House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology's Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight held a hearing examining the implementation of research security measures under the CHIPS and Science Act and NSPM-33. Witnesses included officials from NSF, NASA, NIH, and DOE.
An FDP overview of the current status of federal research funding agency implementation of research security requirements for researchers and institutions, in accordance with the conditions of the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (CHIPS Act) and National Security Presidential Memorandum-33 (NSPM-33).
A COGR overview (November 20, 2025) of the research security-related regulations and frameworks most salient to Technology Transfer Offices, written to help technology transfer professionals navigate practical considerations arising from federal research security requirements.
A chart that compares federal laws, regulations, and policies in the area of science and security. The chart is divided into three separate tabs that cover (a) major federal-wide legislation or policy, (b) agency disclosure requirements for researchers and research institutions; and (c) agency conflict of interest policies. Updated September 30, 2025.
A matrix that lists policies and requirements under the headings of: Disclosures, Agency Risk Assessment, FCOI & COC, Training, Certifications, and Research Security Program for each federal agency. Per COGR, this tool is frequently updated to reflect the release of new documentation. Updated September 30, 2025.
The National Academies Assessing Research Security Efforts in Higher Education working group held a number of meetings and a May workshop with federal and non-federal experts beginning September 2024 and concluding September 4, 2025, to discuss assessment of federal research security efforts. Proceedings from the workshop can be found on the National Academies website.
Published September 3, 2025, a National Academies Committee conducted an expedited study to examine federal research regulations and identify ways to improve regulatory processes and administrative tasks, reduce or eliminate unnecessary work, and modify and remove policies and regulations that have outlived their purpose while maintaining necessary and appropriate integrity, accountability, and oversight. Research security specific options include: implement the NSPM-33 common disclosure forms and disclosure table without deviation; establish common principles for agency research security risk reviews for fundamental research; continue prior efforts to streamline and clarify export controls; and adapt cybersecurity requirements for university settings.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) issued a report on May 20, 2025, summarizing federal research security policy efforts to date, and providing options Congress might consider to address perceived gaps or deficiencies while also remaining cognizant of the potential increase to administrative burden they would present. Proposed options discussed include: a. Expanding sources of foreign support researchers are required to disclose, b. Broadening the scope of who is required to disclose Current and Pending (Other) Support, c. Increasing the frequency of post-award updates, d. Expanding agency requirements when reviewing disclosed information, e. Focusing risk assessment activities more narrowly on critical and emerging technologies, f. Expanding agencies' requirements to report to congress on research security violations, mitigation measures, and implementation status.
September 2024, report ordered by Committee on Homeland Security. States that IHEs which have a relationship with a Confucius Institute or Chinese entity of concern is ineligible to receive any funds from the Department of Homeland Security, unless the institution terminates the relationship.
An August 2024 report emphasizing the importance of the critical quantum information science and technology (QIST) field and the need to enhance interagency cooperation, fund international collaboration, and track global competitiveness.
A COGR overview published in July 2024 summarizing the requirements of the White House OSTP Final Guidelines for Research Security Programs at Covered Institutions across the four required research security program focus areas. It serves as a plain-language companion summary to the OSTP RSP Guidelines memorandum issued July 9, 2024.
Final Research Security Program (RSP) Guidelines published on July 9, 2024, via a memorandum to the heads of federal research funding agencies. Federal agencies are directed to implement the guidelines and provide time for institutional implementation. The four required areas are: cybersecurity, foreign travel security, research security training, and export control training. Agencies are coordinating implementation under a memorandum of agreement and anticipated to issue the requirements in early 2026.
A matrix developed to assist in determining if specific activities are required to be disclosed and what form is appropriate for reporting. Last updated May 2024.
Issued by the White House OSTP in February 2024, this policy requires federal agencies to use the Common Forms for current and pending support and biosketches, noting that NSF will serve as steward. Deviation from the common disclosure forms will require Office of Management and Budget (OMB)/Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review and clearance under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).
A congressional hearing held in February 2024 with representatives from the White House (OSTP), NSF, NIH, and DoE examining federal science agency actions to secure the U.S. science and technology enterprise.
Published February 2024, this document outlines best practices agreed upon by G7 member nations for maintaining secure and open research.
A February 2024 biannual update from the Fast Track Action Subcommittee on Critical and Emerging Technologies of the NSTC that defines critical and emerging technologies (CETs), which are a subset of advanced technologies that have a significant impact on U.S. national security. [List of CETs is outlined on pages 8-11]
Per Section 10631 of the CHIPS and Science Act, this document issued in February 2024 from the White House OSTP provides definitions of both foreign talent recruitment programs (FTRPs) and malign foreign talent recruitment programs (MFTRPs) [pages 4-6] and what is not considered an FTRP. A foreign talent recruitment program is any program, position, or activity that includes compensation in the form of cash, in-kind compensation, including research funding, promised future compensation, complimentary foreign travel, things of non de minimis value, honorific titles, career advancement opportunities, or other types of remuneration or consideration directly provided by a foreign country at any level or their designee, or an entity based in, funded by, or affiliated with a foreign country.
A summary document from AAU, updated in January 2024, that references key federal documentation that has been developed to address foreign influence in research.
A 2024 report by the National Academies: Sciences, Engineering and Medicine examining international talent programs in the context of the changing global environment.
A condensed and consolidated one-hour version of the four federal training modules developed by the University of Michigan in collaboration with Ohio State University, Stanford University, and Duke University. Other academic institutions or organizations can download for their use. The training includes two editable html-based files that can be modified to supply institution-specific contact information and links to resources. SCORM files, Storyline file, and written version of the narrative are available.
An updated one-hour condensed and consolidated federal research security training module offered by the SECURE Center. NSF, NIH, DoD, DOE, and USDA have indicated that the condensed module meets their research security requirements. The SCORM files (for upload in the institution's learning management systems), Storyline file, and transcript can also be found on the website. The training includes two, four or six editable html-based files that can be modified to supply institution-specific contact information and links to resources. A preview version can be viewed on the website and a version that offers a certificate of completion is now available.