How to Stop China’s Theft of America's Taxpayer-Funded Research: The Reforms We Need and Rebuttals to Those Who Oppose Them

On October 13, the U.S. House Select Committee on China released a new report, How to Stop China’s Theft of America's Taxpayer-Funded Research: The Reforms We Need and Rebuttals to Those Who Oppose Them. The 39-page report provides a rebuttal to arguments the Select Committee has encountered related to research security and makes recommendations to strengthen research security. The report suggests that “the purpose of research security safeguards is not to eliminate international collaboration or undermine scientific progress. Rather, the purpose is to ensure that taxpayer-funded research does not directly or indirectly support foreign military advancement, human rights abuses, strategic competitors, or entities acting contrary to U.S. national security interests.” The report goes into particular detail on how co-authorship is indicative of collaboration, the unequal benefits of collaboration with China, prohibition of collaboration with high-risk entities, the inability of academia to self-police research security risks, and the need to protect federal research funding. The Committee makes the case, with examples, that there is a repeated pattern of intentional compliance failures and not simple clerical errors with reporting. The report acknowledges the continued benefit from contributions of Chinese American researchers, while pointing out the Chinese government’s policy of technology and scientific talent acquisition. The four recommendations are: 1) Pass the Securing Innovation and Research from Adversaries (SIRA) Act: This act (H.R. 8901) would prohibit any federally funded research award or any other form of federal financial assistance for use by an individual or entity listed on a U.S. government restricted entity list or an individual associated with such an entity. The restricted entity list in the act closely follows the current DoW prohibited entity lists. Research collaboration is broadly defined to include co-authorship (as noted in the report), data sharing or processing, material transfer, personnel exchanges, visiting scholar appointments, or joint supervision of students or researchers. The report encourages institutions to proactively implement policies “prohibiting federally funded research collaborations with entities that pose identified national security risks.” 2) Standardized Author Contribution Disclosure Requirements for (at a minimum) Federally Funded Research: Require standardized author contribution statements on publications or other outputs resulting from federally funded research with agencies evaluating enforcement. 3) Create Incentives for Universities That Adopt Strong Research Security Practices: Institutions that exceed minimum research security requirements and “demonstrate a sustained commitment to federal funded research” could be designated as “trusted universities,” which could include incentives such as priority for certain funding opportunities. 4) Government-Wide Adoption of Fact-Based Suspension and Debarment Authorities Beyond Conviction-Based Suspension and Debarments: Agencies should standardize suspension and debarment authorities for research security violations, more aggressively use available administrative false claims authorities, and not treat criminal convictions, civil judgements, or prosecution as prerequisites for administrative accountability. To support the report, the Select Committee released over 700 pages of records (one case was over 200 pages) covering 20 research security cases at U.S. institutions investigated by the National Science Foundation (NSF) Office of Inspector General (OIG), including OIG reports from 2018-2025. The records identify efforts by China to recruit researchers at U.S. institutions in key technology areas. The cases involved undisclosed foreign appointments, participation in talent programs, conflicts of commitment, failure to disclose foreign funding and compensation, and research misconduct. Cases resulted in suspension or termination of awards, debarment of researchers from receiving federal funding or serving as NSF reviewers, and criminal indictments (e.g., wire fraud). Several of the researchers resigned from their positions and left the U.S. for China. The Committee’s reported aim with the release of previously non-public records is to provide greater transparency on the evidence underlying research security investigations and the findings informing the Committee’s recommendations.